The following study emerges from a larger project, which is to draft a treatise entitled
----------------------1. For more than two hundred years, the antislavery movement has had a monopoly on what 'slavery' means. Over the last eighty years, this has meant that the definition of 'slavery' in law has lived in the shadow lands of disuse resulting from the anti-slavery movement's messianic ambitions to rid the world of human exploitation. Yet, this ambition has meant that 'slavery' as propagated by the anti-slavery movement has become an ever-growing phenomenon, so that for instance, the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery has examined issues such as apartheid, colonialism and incest, under the guise of slavery 1 . In proportion to slavery's growth in breadth, has been its diminishing legal worth, to the extent that the leading academic (and President of the NGO Free the Slaves) in the field, Kevin Bales, has discarded the legal definition for his own, one based on "three key dimensions: loss of free will, the appropriation of labour power, and the use or threat of violence" 2 ; and a recent study on Modern Slavery in the United Kingdom defined it as "severe economic exploitation; the lack of a human rights framework; and control of one person over another by the prospect or reality of violence" 3 . The antislavery ownership of the term slavery, however, no longer holds true, as 'slavery' in the twenty-first century comes up against a countervailing human right: the right of an accused to "be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge" of enslavement before the International Criminal That definition is added to under Article 7(a) of the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery as follows:
"Slavery" means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926, the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, and "slave" means a person in such condition or status.
Finally, under the Rome Statute, 'enslavement' is deemed a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(c) and defined at Article 7(2)(c) as:
"Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
3. What remains consistent in each of these definitions is the phrase: "the powers attaching to the right of ownership". The notion of 'ownership' thus appears to be the sine qua non of slavery in international law -yet this is not an accurate reading of the phrase. This paper considers the evolution of the definition of slavery as it emerges in 1926 and reiterated in 1956 as a means to understand its parameters while giving special attention to the phrase 'any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership' -as opposed to 'ownership'. This is done so as to give content and context to the notion of enslavement before the International Criminal Court and thus provide for the possibility of actually holding an individual internationally criminally responsible for this crime against humanity. What emerges from this consideration of the legal definition of slavery is an understanding which does not diverge significantly from what Professor Bales or other anti-slavery advocates put forward as their understanding that of slavery but channels such an understanding away from meaningless hyperbole manifest in the UN Working Group towards a definition which can be relied upon in a court of law and used to find persons guilty of enslavement. It should be said that the anti-slavery movement has misinterpreted the definition of slavery, having picked up on a vein of interpretation which has channelled the understanding of slavery away from its legal definition towards one which has done a disservice to the anti-slavery movement. From the preparation of the 1926 definition onwards, attempts have been made to obfuscate the term 'slavery' and to distance its legal definition from a definition that might well be attached to any type of exploitation. Individuals interested in ending exploitation in the guise of forced, bonded, or indentured labour or sexual exploitation muddied the waters of what was meant by 'slavery' and sought to intimate that 'slavery' persisted beyond the 1926 Convention definition, even where the 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' were not at issue. In so doing, they forced the legal definition of slavery into a shadow land of disuse where it retained its normative value among States but hibernated as an antislavery tool for repression or advocacy against exploitation. This paper seeks to redress the balance by demonstrating that the legal definition goes further in advancing an anti-slavery agenda as it is wide enough to be accepted by advocates while opening a new vista, one which can be used to hold individuals criminally responsible for enslavement, whether de jure or de facto. Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised 7 .
More importantly for this study, was Viscount Cecil's deftly drafted Report accompanying the proposed 1926 Convention, which appeared to allow for the abolition of slavery in all its forms yet, in fact, clearly established that the 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' were required for slavery to exist. It is from this Report that advocates of an expanded understanding of slavery have sought to justify their claims. To bring about progressively and as soon as possible the disappearance of slavery in every form, notably in the case of domestic slavery and similar conditions. 8 7. In his Report to the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 1925 Draft Convention, Viscount Cecil considered the notion of 'domestic slavery and similar conditions' which he noted was meant to "include all forms of 'debt slavery', the enslaving of persons disguised as the adoption of children, and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, etc. as mention in the report of the Temporary Slavery Commission" 9 . However, in the intervening year, when this time reporting to the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 1926 Convention, Viscount Cecil took into consideration the comments made by States and modified his language to make plain that there was but one type of 'slavery' -where the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. While mentioning the work of the Temporary Slavery Commission once more, Chelwood rephrased the manifestation of exploitation so as to include the term 'slavery' where it had been absent in the Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission. Viscount Cecil enumerated the types of domestic slavery and similar conditions as "all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission and to which I referred to last year"
10 . Yet Viscount Cecil speaks of "debt slavery" where the Temporary Slavery Commission spoke of "forms of pledging or reducing to servitude of persons for debt or other reason". Instead of using the language of the Commission, "considering conditions analogous to slavery, as for example", the adoption "of children, […] with a view to their virtual enslavement" or the acquisition "of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry", Viscount Cecil's 1926 Report speaks of the "enslaving of persons disguised as adoption of children and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry"
11 . Furthermore, Viscount Cecil sought to reaffirm the link between slavery and the powers attached to the right of ownership, as he noted that: Even if, as is possible, these last practices do not come under the definition of slavery as it is given in Article 1, the [drafting] Commission is unanimously of the opinion that they must be combated. In a more general way, it interprets Article 2 as tending to bring about the disappearance from written legislation or from the custom of the country of everything which admits the maintenance by a private individual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights which an individual can have over things 12 .
In other words, Viscount Cecil recognised that 'slavery in all it forms' required the demonstration of a power attached to the right of ownership to be exercised over an individual as established by the definition of slavery in Article 1.
8. The modification of the 1925 draft of the convention so as expunge the term 'domestic and other slavery' was brought about as a result of comments made by States which sought to ensure that only slavery as defined by Article 1(a) was included in the Convention and that other types of exploitation would be excluded. This precise point was made by the Union of South Africa, when it commented that the 1925 draft "Convention as drafted goes somewhat further than seems necessary for the abolition of slavery […]" 13 .
That definition puts as the test of slavery the status or condition of a person over whom all or any of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. In other words, a person is a slave if any other person can, by law or enforceable custom, claim such property in him as would be claimed if he were an inanimate object; and thus the natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration therefrom is taken from him 14 .
The South African comment continues:
If the draft Convention had merely proceed to impose on the contracting parties the duty to prevent within their community any person being in a condition of slavery as defined in If it does not go beyond those objects, there seems no reason why the so-called domestic slavery should not be included in the definition of Article 1. The argument seems to be that the so-called domestic slavery can only be brought to an end progressively; and thus admittedly the draft Convention is asking the signatories to the Convention to interfere as opportunity presents itself in the social conditions and custom of the people forming their communities. It is even uncertain as to what would thus be suppressed because to 'domestic slavery' is added 'or similar condition' -an expression by which, it is explained, is meant all forms of "debt slavery", enslaving of persons disguised as adoption of children, and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry.
Having noted this, the submission by the Union of South Africa turned to legal analysis:
Now either such persons are sui juris [re: a separate category] or they are not. If they are sui juris, they can only become subject to domestic slavery or similar conditions by a voluntary act, and the essential element of slavery is absent. If they are not sui juris, they can only be subject to domestic slavery or similar conditions by the acts of those who by law are their guardians, and it is no more than a form of paternal power. If, further, they have become domestic slaves or persons in similar conditions in the manner indicated, that can only be because others have acquired a right of property in them, and they are therefore slaves as defined in Article 1. There seems no reason, then, to differentiate them from the person in a condition of slavery defined in that article. If, on the other hand, no right of property in them exists, the scope of the draft Convention seems to be extended to compel the signatories to undertake to interfere in social customs 15 .
9. Beyond these comments, which were at the heart of the suppression of the phrase 'domestic slavery and similar conditions', two failed attempts by States seeking to expand the definition of slavery beyond manifestations of the powers attached to the right of ownership transpired. It is important, however, to keep the fundamental distinction clearly in mind, and to realise that the status of 'serfdom' is a condition 'analogous to slavery' rather than a condition of actual slavery, and that the question whether it amounts to 'slavery' within the definition of the Slavery Convention must depend upon the facts connected with each of the various systems of 'serfdom' 20 .
The Committee of Experts on Slavery was more explicit in regard to its considerations of debt slavery, noting that at least theoretically:
debt slavery is only a temporary form, for the assumption is that the slavery ends as soon as the debt is repaid. In practice, however, the conditions in which the debt-slave lives are often of the nature that repayment is an impossibility and the debtor is therefore a slave for life. Even worse than this The Report of the Assembly Committee responsible for drafting of the convention has explained that reference to domestic slavery and similar conditions was omitted 'because it was believed that such conditions came within the definition of slavery contained in the first article and that no further prohibition of them in express terms was necessary. This applies not only to domestic slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission i.e., debt slavery, enslaving of persons disguised as payment of dowry, etc.'. By referring to "any or all of the powers of ownership" in its definition of slavery, and setting forth as its stated purpose the "abolition of slavery in all its forms" the Slavery Convention covered not only domestic slavery but also the other forms of slavery listed in the Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission
To which the following footnote was added:
The report to the Sixth Committee of the League of Nations Assembly in 1926 also clarified, in relation to article 2 (b) of the final text of the Slavery Convention, that the words "notably in the case of domestic slavery and similar conditions" were being omitted on the grounds that "such conditions come within the definition of slavery contained in the first article and that no further prohibition of them in express terms was necessary. This provision applies not only to domestic slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission … i.e. debt slavery, the enslaving of persons disguised as adoption of children and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry".
Thus from both these considerations of the definition of slavery is the omitted what Viscount Cecil went on to say: Even if, as is possible, these last practices do not come under the definition of slavery as it is given in Article 1, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that they must be combated. In a more general way, it interprets Article 2 as tending to bring about the disappearance from written legislation or from the custom of the country of everything which admits the maintenance by a private individual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights which an individual can have over things. 
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Taking these examples into consideration, it is clear that ten years after the establishment of the 1926 Convention, the expert body established to consider issues of slavery was of the view that the definition of slavery confined to the parameters of Article 1(a). Thus, the powers attached to the right of ownership remained the sine quo non of slavery.
The Powers Attached to the Right of Ownership
12. Consideration now turns to the United Nations era, not to consider the divergence between the legal definition of slavery and the ever-expanding notion of slavery, but instead, to examine the most significant pronouncement regarding the legal definition of slavery as the starting point for an examination of what constitutes 'any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership'. In 1949 the United Nations General Assembly requested that the Economic and Social Council study the problem of slavery 22 . As a result, the Economic and Social Council, by way of a resolution, instructed the UN Secretary-General to appoint an ad hoc committee to, inter alia, "suggest methods of attacking" issues of slavery and servitude 23 . To that end, the Ad Hoc Committee expressed the view in its first Report that: certain modifications of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 appeared to be necessary and that it might prove desirable to draft a new convention broader in scope, or alternatively, to draw up an instrument supplementary to the existing Convention 25 .
By the time the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery produced its second Report in 1951, it called for "the preparation and adoption of an international convention supplementary to the Slavery Convention of 1926", which "should be more precise than that instrument in defining the exact forms of servitude dealt with" 26 . The United Nations Economic and Social Council, for its part, having considered the Draft Resolution prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Slavery noted that it was unable to deal with the Recommendations, as "the material is not at present in such a form as to allow the Council to act upon", and called on the Secretary-General to report back to it "indicating what action the United Nations and specialized agencies could most appropriately take in order to achieve the elimination of slavery, the slave trade and forms of servitude resembling slavery in their effects" 27 .
13. The Secretary-General reported back to the Economic and Social Council in 1953, stating that the Ad Hoc Committee had envisioned an instrument which covered the subject matter of the 1926 Convention and "certain other institutions and practices" and would "be in operation side by side with that Convention" 28 . The Secretary-General also considered the definition of slavery as found in the 1926 Convention. He, started by once more noting Viscount Cecil's Report on the 1926 Convention and cited the relevant text in full:
In this interpretation the Rapporteur stated that reference to domestic slavery and similar conditions was omitted:
because it was believed that such conditions came within the definition of slavery contained in the first article and that no further prohibition of them in express terms was necessary. This applies not only to domestic slavery but to all those conditions mentioned by the Temporary Slavery Commission … i.e., 'debt slavery', the enslaving of persons disguised as the adoption of children, and the acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, etc. Even if, as is possible, these last practices do not come under the definition of slavery as it is given in Article 1, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that they must be combated. In a more general way, it interprets Article 2 as tending to bring about the disappearance from written legislation or from the custom of the country of everything which admits the maintenance by a private individual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights which an individual can have over things.
It would appear from a study of the International Slavery Convention of 1926, and of the preparatory work leading to its adoption, that the obligations of the Parties therefore extended to all institutions or practices, whether or not designated as 'slavery', provided that, as stated in Article 1 of the Convention, 'any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised' over a person in these institutions or practices.
14. The Secretary-General, then turned, by way of an extended footnote at the end of the paragraph, to consider the meaning of the phrase 'any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised'. According to the Secretary-General, one "does not find in the travaux préparatoires of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 any precise indication of the meaning of the 'power attaching to the right of ownership' to which the drafters of that Convention intended to refer, or of the legal system by which they were guided". The Secretary-General then continued:
In the absence of such an indication, it may reasonably be assumed that the basic concept which they had in mind was that of the authority of the master over the slave in Roman law, the 'dominica potestas'. This authority was of an absolute nature, comparable to the rights of ownership, which included the right to acquire, to use, or to dispose of a thing or of an animal or of its fruits or offspring. By virtue of this right, in its most general form the master could utilise the services of the slave in his house or on his land. The children of the slave also belonged to the master, and he could sell them separately from their mother and father. As a result of the evolution of Roman law, the authority of the master over the slave was subjected successively to more and more limitations; but 27 Economic and Social Council, Resolution 388(XIII), 10 September 1951. 28 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of Servitude (Report of the Secretary-General), UN Doc. E/2357, 27 January 1953, p. 40. even though it was restricted, the master never had towards his slave the obligations that an employer has today towards his servant or employee. 29 To justify this interpretation, the Secretary-General pointed to the submission of the Union of South Africa, saying that this "seems to have been the guiding concept in Geneva, as is apparent from the following quotation of a government communication to the League of Nations in 1926": 'a person is a slave if any other person can, by law or enforceable custom, claim such property in him as would be claimed if he were an inanimate object; and thus the natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration therefrom is taken from him. The term also seems to imply a permanent status or condition of a person whose natural freedom is taken away, for from the proprietary interest of the other person in the person to whom that status attaches is implied a right of disposal of sale, gift or exchange '. 30 15. Turning to the Roman Law, in his classic 1908 text The Roman Law of Slavery, W. W. Buckland considered the laws applicable to slaves during the Roman era. Interestingly, much of the book deals with the slave as a man and the law applicable to a slave as a person, while only one chapter is devoted to the slave as a thing that is chattel slavery. This is so because the essence of slave laws since time immemorial has been the inability to treat slaves exclusively as property and, thus, to recognise in them their humanity. With regard to Roman Law, it should first be noted that slavery as an institution persists though it was recognised as being against natural law. The institution was allowed to persisted as against this Ius Naturale as the Ius Gentium (the Law of Nations) deemed that captives in war, instead of being put to death, forfeited their lives to their captors and thus became enslaved 31 . From this flowed the Roman Law notion of the individual as res -a thing or an object -which can be owned, and thus was chattel. This notion of chattel -'goods' -the personal property of another, is the fundamental basis for slavery in Roman Law. As Buckland writes, the "slave, like any other chattel, might be the subject of all ordinary transactions"
32 . But what were these transactions, and did they differ where slaves were concerned?
Ownership is a rather elusive concept. A social construct, it is typically understood as a priorital right over something. As A. M. Honoré puts it; "those legal rights, duties and other incidents which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the greatest interest in a thing admitted by a mature legal system" 33 . That 'greatest interest' thus does not mean that an individual has a sovereign or absolute right over a thing but, rather, the ability to enjoy and dispose of the thing "provided that one abstains from any use forbidden by statute or subordinate legislation" 34 . Thus ownership entails rights, but those rights are often termed not as absolute but as right vis-à-vis others where one holds the best claim to a thing. Moving beyond the common characterisation of ownership as constituting a 'bundle of rights', Honoré lists what he calls the eleven 'standard incidents' of ownership, of which the majority are rights, but some are also obligations. These incidents are:
1) The right to posses;
7)
The right or incidents of transmissibility; 2) The right to use;
8)
The right or incidents of absence of the term; 3) The right to manage;
9) The prohibition of harmful use; 4) The right to the income of the thing; 10) Liability to execution; and 5) The right to the capital; 11) Incident of residuarity. 6) The right to security;
16. Thus, it is within these parameters that one may speak of ownership. With regard to slavery, ownership meant the ability to posses and use a slave, to compel and gain from the slave's labour, but also to buy, sell, or even destroy a slave, though even under Roman Law the killing of a slave was criminal as was their use as gladiators … that is, without the consent of a magistrate 36 . Likewise under Louis XIV's 1685 Code Noir, an owner could only put to death a fugitive slave after s/he had been caught thee times:
The fugitive slave who has been on the run for one month from the day his master reported him to the police, shall have his ears cut off and shall be branded with a fleur de lys on one shoulder. If he commits the same infraction for another month, again counting from the day he is reported, he shall have his hamstring cut and be branded with a fleur de lys on the other shoulder. The third time, he shall be put to death. The legal standing or position of a person as determined by his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain limitations; condition in respect, e.g., of liberty or servitude, marriage or celibacy, infancy or majority 38 .
Flowing from this definition, the Dictionary also notes the ability to transfer such status and the ability to use the term "in application of things", using as an example the following taken from the 6 November 1914 edition of the Daily News: "The Sultan of Turkey not having ratified the Convention relating to the status of enemy merchant vessels". While one cannot infer from this that the inclusion of the term 'status' in a legal definition mandates that the term be used in its legal sense, the lead up to the drafting of the 1926 Convention makes plain that the drafters were using the term in the legal sense. abolition of slavery is that the status of slavery should no longer be recognised in the eye of the law" and went so far as to define what it meant by the abolition of the legal status of slavery:
The "abolition of the legal status" means that every slave has the right to assert his freedom, without ransom and without going through any formal process of fulfilling any prior condition, by simply leaving his master if he desire to do so. He enjoys and can exercise all the civil rights of a free mane.g., can sue and be sued in court, can prosecute his master for ill-treatment, and can bequeath and inherit property.
39
While this definition was not taken up during the drafting process which led to the 1926 Convention, the Temporary Slavery Commission's suggestion that the "abolition of the legal status of slavery" might form part of a proposed instrument was clearly integrated into the definition of slavery in Article 1(a).
20. In the definition of slavery, the notion of 'status' is juxtaposed with the term 'condition' by the conjunction 'or'. 'Condition', as a noun, is defined, inter alia, in the Oxford English Dictionary as a "mode of being, state, position, nature". The most pertinent example given under this heading is a "characteristic, property, attribute, quality (of men or things)". As opposed to the term 'status', the definition in law provided in the Oxford English Dictionary of 'condition' does not apply in the context of the definition of slavery, which definition reads: "In a legal instrument, e.g. a will, or contract, a provision on which its legal force or effect is made to depend", i.e. "Something demanded or required as a prerequisite to the granting or performance of something else; a provision, a stipulation". With regard to the travaux préparatoires and the 1926 Convention, the term 'condition' was used during the negotiations of the Convention as part of the phrase 'domestic slavery and similar conditions' which, it will be recalled, was excluded from the substance of the Convention but was recognised as being subsumed within the definition of Slavery during the negotiation process, were the powers of the right of ownership were exercised. While referring to the types of exploitation that the Temporary Slavery Commission had wished to see in the Convention, Viscount Cecil conceded that, while such conditions might not always come under the definition in Article 1, it was clear that the obligation manifest in Article 2 -"To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms" -touched on two elements, namely the bringing about of the disappearance from "written legislation" and "the custom of a country" of those items which admit "the maintenance by a private individual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights which an individual can have over things" 40 .
21. From the forgone textual interpretation, it may be said that the phrase 'status or condition' seeks to distinguish between slavery de jure and slavery de facto, whereby slavery as 'status' is a recognition of slavery in law; and slavery as 'condition' is to be understood as slavery in fact. This interpretation is confirmed first by the dichotomy put forward by Viscount Cecil between the suppression of slavery in law: 'written legislation' and in fact: 'the custom of a country'. definition implies that one would have the powers of ownership but for the fact that the right of ownership cannot be vindicated in law. In other words, exercising the 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' should be understood as meaning that the enslavement of a person does not mean the possession of a legal right of ownership over the individual (such a claim could find no remedy in modern day law) but the powers attached to such rights but for the fact that ownership is illegal. To use an analogy, the powers attached to the right of ownership are the powers that manifest themselves say, when two drug dealers have a dispute over a kilo of heroin. Neither can have their claim dealt with in a court of law, but one or the other will exercise the powers attached to the right of ownership, for example, possession; thus what would amount to a right of ownership but for the fact that it is illegal to own, or possess, heroin.
To buttress this argument, consider Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
42 , which mandates that where there is a difference in meaning between the authentic texts of a treaty, the meaning which is best reconciled with the object and purpose of the treaty is to be adopted -the notion of 'powers attaching to' comes into play. In the only other language in which the text was authenticated inFrench -the phrase 'powers attaching to' appears as 'les attributs', which can be translated into English in the literal sense of 'attributes' of the right of ownership. Thus we are not speaking of a right of ownership, but exercising the attributes of the right of ownership without exercising the legal right of ownership. Thus, these three elements, the difference between status and condition, the notion of the 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' versus the right of ownership; and the use of the term 'les attributs' in the French text, all point towards a definition of slavery that includes both de jure and de facto enslavement. Thus, when these characteristics of the various powers attached to the right of ownership are considered in light of the overall definition of slavery -that is to say "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercise" -what emerges are elements which, taken separately or together, constitute slavery in law.
25. Turning to each of the six characteristics of the powers attached to the right of ownership put forward by the UN Secretary-General, it should first be noted that the use of 'servile status' by the SecretaryGeneral predates the use of the term as noted in Article 7(2) of the 1956 Convention: "'A person of servile status' means a person in the condition or status resulting from any of the institutions or practices mentioned in article 1 of this Convention", with the institutions and practices in Article 1 being debt bondage, serfdom, forced or sham marriages and exploitation of children via adoptions. Thus, the definition as set out in Article 7(2) of the 1956 Convention of 'a person of servile status' is not applicable here, as being retrospective, but instead, 'servile status' should be understood as being synonymous with the status or condition wherein, if one of the six characteristics of the Secretary-General is attached, a power of the right of ownership would be exercised, and thus slavery would be manifest. Turning to the first and fourth of the Secretary-General's six characteristics, a person who finds him or herself being made the object of purchase or transfer would, thus, be in the status or condition of slavery. Put this way, it becomes clear that being made the object of purchase or transfer, if this were legal, would create in the individual the status of a slave and create for the master a right of ownership over the individual, whereas if a person is made the object of purchase or transfer where no such selling or transfer is possible in law it creates for the individual the condition of slavery and manifests, for the recipient, an exercise of a power attached to the right of ownership, though not a right of ownership able to be vindicated in a court of law.
26. The second of the UN Secretary-General's six characteristics of the powers attaching to the right of ownership turns on the ability to exploit another: "the master may use the individual of servile status, and in particular his capacity to work, in an absolute manner, without any restriction other than that which might be expressly provided by law". Here the apparent contradiction between being able to use an individual in 'an absolute manner' as against 'without any restriction other than that which might be expressly provided by law' is solved by returning to the earlier discussion which the Secretary-General had with regard to Roman Law where he noted that the "authority of the master over the slave was subjected successively to more and more limitations; but even though it was restricted, the master never had towards his slave the obligations that an employer has today towards his servant or employee". 44 Of course in a state of de facto slavery, due to its overall illegal nature, there would be no restrictions expressly provided by law but, instead, an overarching prohibition. Despite this, or as a result, the 'master' would be able to use the individual and their labour 'in an absolute manner'. The third of the Secretary-General's characteristics, follows closely on from the second, as 'the products of labour of the individual of servile status become the property of the master without any compensation commensurate to the value of the labour'. Here whether having the status of slavery or being in the condition of slavery remains irrelevant to the fact that the master would benefit from exercising the power attached to the right of ownership with regard to the fruits of one's labour. The 1926 submission of the Union of South Africa, it may be recalled, picked up on this precise point:
That definition puts as the test of slavery the status or condition of a person over whom all or any of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. In other words, a person is a slave if any other person can, by law or enforceable custom, claim such property in him as would be claimed if he were an inanimate object; and thus the natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration therefrom is taken from him 45 .
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Id., p. 29. 27. Having already considered the fourth of the Secretary-General's six characteristics of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, consideration now turns to the fifth: "the servile status is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be terminated by the will of the individual subject to it". The discussion by the Secretary-General deals with an assertion made in 1926 by Union of South Africa that the definition of slavery "also seems to imply a permanent status or condition of a person whose natural freedom is taken away, from the proprietary interest of the other person in the person to whom that status attaches is implied a right of disposal of sale, gift or exchange" 46 . But here one sees that the Secretary-General is not concerned as much with there being a permanent status or condition which would last until the slave dies but, instead, that status or condition "cannot be terminated by the will of the individual subject to it", thus an indefinite status or condition.
28. The final characterisation of a power attached to the right of ownership which the Secretary-General mentions is that 'the servile status is transmitted ipso facto to descendants of the individual having such status'. Little need be said about this power except that, unlike Honoré's "right or incidents of transmissibility", such a power looks also to be ipso facto illegal and thus as a legal status it might no longer exist. Yet, for instances in the area of debt-bondage, the 'condition' of slavery manifests itself through the inheritance of debt, and, as such, it remains, like the other UN Secretary-General's characteristics, an authoritative description of a manifestation of the exercise of a power attached to the right of ownership, and thus slavery. All practicable and necessary measures, including legislation where appropriate, shall be taken to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions and practices, where they still exist. The representative of India and Australia agreed that the amendment was necessary and that it would help to clarify the text.
The Committee unanimously adopted the amendment at the 11th meeting. In his Memorandum, the Secretary-General when on to explained that the proposal by the AntiSlavery Society was being put forward as the "possibility of differing opinions as to the precise scope of these definitions would thus be recognized" id., p. 22. 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
Excluding the final sentence of this footnote which has been addressed above, the inclusion of the 'purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person' adds credence to the analysis undertaken above with regard to slavery in general international law, that is to say that 'slavery', like 'enslavement' is to be understood as not only being manifest in de jure slavery but also in de facto slavery. Thus, it should be understood that the Elements of the Crimes with regard to enslavement truly reflect the evolution of the fundamental elements of slavery in general international law, namely the exercise of 'any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership'.
36. Before considering the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which it can be said, confirms the understanding of 'slavery' within international criminal law, attention should be given to the European Court of Human Rights' very narrow interpretation in its only significant consideration of the issue, the 2005 Siliadin case. As opposed to international criminal law, where exploitation is manifest only in the crime of slavery, within international human rights law servitude and slavery often go hand-in-hand as they appear in the same article in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and, with regard to the case at hand, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Right and Fundamental Freedoms. In Siliadin, the Court found that there was a case of forced labour and servitude in violation of Article 4, but it was unwilling to find that there had been a breach of the provision related to slavery, despite depending on the 1926 conventional definition:
It notes that this definition corresponds to the "classic" meaning of slavery as it was practiced for centuries. Although the applicant was, in the instant case, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that Mr and Mrs B. exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an "object". 55 37. The rationale of the judges here plays not on the powers attached to the right of ownership but on the requirement of demonstrating 'a genuine right of legal ownership'. This truly narrow interpretation of the provisions of Article 1(a) of the 1926 Convention, does not reflect a consideration of the travaux préparatoires and may well be a manifestation -maybe the first -of the fragmentation of international law. Thus, that there are two diverging streams of interpretation in international law, between slavery in international human rights law -or at least within the context of the Council of Europe -which can be juxtaposed to 'servitude' and thus raises the threshold for meeting a determination of slavery as requiring a 'genuine right of legal ownership'. It should be said, however, that this interpretation is at odds with the evolution of the term 'slavery' in general international law. Thus, Siliadin need not detain us, in part because it reflects a European context in which the 1950 Convention was drafted in the wake of atrocities of the Second World War which included the legal use of slave labour; and thus within a European context to use 'servitude' for de facto slavery, allows the term 'slavery' to be kept in reserve for situations mirroring the 1930s and the rise of exploitative policies instituted by the likes of the National Socialist Party in Germany, as manifest in de jure enslavement.
38. More importantly, Siliadin need not detain us as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has pronounced itself on 'enslavement' as a crime against humanity and has made determinations which are clearly in tune with the understanding of 'slavery' in general international law as presented here. In the Kunarac case, the Trial Chamber made a determination, having surveyed international human rights law, international humanitarian law, the work of the International Law Commission, and the jurisprudence of the Tokyo and Nuremburg tribunals, that at the time of the offences under consideration, "enslavement as a crime against humanity in customary international law consisted of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person" 56 . The Trial Chamber noted that while this definition "may be broader than the traditional and sometimes apparently distinct definitions of slavery, the slave trade and servitude or forced or compulsory labour found in other areas of international law", it pointed to the case-law of the Second World War and the work of the International Law Commission as supporting its conclusion.
The Trial Chamber went on to say:
Under this definition, indications of enslavement include elements of control and ownership; the restriction or control of an individual's autonomy, freedom of choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the perpetrator. The consent or free will of the victim is absent. It is often rendered impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion ; the fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of power; the victim's position of vulnerability; detention or captivity, psychological oppression or socio -economic conditions. Further indications of enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though not necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking.
The Trial Chamber continued:
With respect to forced or compulsory labour or service, international law, including some of the provisions of Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocols, make clear that not all labour or service by protected persons, including civilians, in armed conflicts, is prohibited -strict conditions are, however, set for such labour or service. The 'acquisition' or 'disposal' of someone for monetary or other compensation is not a requirement for enslavement. Doing so, however, is a prime example of the exercise of the right of ownership over someone. The duration of the suspected exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership is another factor that may be considered when determining whether someone was enslaved; however, its importance in any given case will depend on the existence of other indications of enslavement. Detaining or keeping someone in captivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of a case, usually not constitute enslavement.
The Trial Chamber then concluded by noting that it was in general agreement with the factors adduced by the Prosecutor in the case:
The Trial Chamber is therefore in general agreement with the factors put forward by the Prosecutor, to be taken into consideration in determining whether enslavement was committed. These are the control of someone's movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour. The Prosecutor also submitted that the mere ability to buy, sell, trade or inherit a person or his or her labours or services could be a relevant factor. The Trial Chamber considers that the mere ability to do so is insufficient, such actions actually occurring could be a relevant factor. In the case of these various contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with 'chattel slavery', but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical personality; the destruction is greater in the case of 'chattel slavery' but the difference is one of degree.
41. The Appeals Chamber did in fact consider the 1926 definition of slavery, drawing the same conclusions as emerge from the above study of the travaux préparatoires:
The Appeals Chamber will however observe that the law does not know of a 'right of ownership over a person'. Article 1(1) [sic] of the 1926 Slavery Convention speaks more guardedly 'of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.' That language is to be preferred.
The Appeals Chamber considers that the question whether a particular phenomenon is a form of enslavement will depend on the operation of the factors or indicia of enslavement identified by the Trial Chamber. These factors include the "control of someone's movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour". Consequently, it is not possible exhaustively to enumerate all of the contemporary forms of slavery which are comprehended in the expansion of the original idea; this Judgement is limited to the case in hand. 59 42. The Appeals Chamber turned to the "Appellants' contention that lack of resistance or the absence of a clear and constant lack of consent during the entire time of the detention can be interpreted as a sign of consent". The Appeals Chamber, for its part, did "not accept the premise that lack of consent is an element of the crime since, in its view, enslavement flows from claimed rights of ownership"; accordingly, lack of consent does not have to be proved by the Prosecutor as an element of the crime. However, consent may be relevant from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber considers that circumstances which render it impossible to express consent may be sufficient to presume the absence of consent. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the circumstances in this case were of this kind.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber continued:
The Appellants contend that another element of the crime of enslavement requires the victims to be enslaved for an indefinite or at least for a prolonged period of time. The Trial Chamber found that the duration of the detention is another factor that can be considered but that its importance will depend on the existence of other indications of enslavement. The Appeals Chamber upholds this finding and observes that the duration of the enslavement is not an element of the crime. The question turns on the quality of the relationship between the accused and the victim. A number of factors determine that quality. One of them is the duration of the relationship. The Appeals Chamber considers that the period of time, which is appropriate, will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
43. Finally, the Appeals Chamber turned to the issue of mens rea with regard to the enslavement, where it concurred with the Trial Chamber "that the required mens rea consists of the intentional exercise of a power attaching to the right of ownership. It is not required to prove that the accused intended to detain 59 Id., paras. 118-119.
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the victims under constant control for a prolonged period of time in order to use them for sexual acts" 60 . The Appeals Chamber then concluded that it was "of the opinion that the Trial Chamber's definition of the crime of enslavement is not too broad and reflects customary international law at the time when the alleged crimes were committed". , which has lead to interpreting the term 'slavery' as being so all-encompassing as to render it meaningless in law. What this Paper has sought to do is to consider the definition of Article 1(a) of the 1926 Convention in-depth, and to demonstrate that a legal interpretation of the term 'slavery' get one not only as far, but arguable further, than either Bales academic definition (loss of free will, the appropriation of labour power, and the use or threat of violence) or the ever expanding definition used within a number of United Nation fora.
Conclusion

Having considered the drafting history of the 1926 and the 1956
Conventions with regard to pronouncement made as to the phrase 'powers attaching to the right of ownership', this Paper has shown that the definition of Article 1(a) as encompasses not only de jure, but de facto, slavery; it also brings with it, out of the shadow lands, six characteristics which the United Nations Secretary-General put forward in his 1953 Memorandum as being powers attached to the right of ownership. The fundamental argument of this Paper is as follows: to exercise the right of ownership over an individual is fundamentally different than exercising powers attached to the right of ownership. Using the analogy of a dispute over illegal drugs, it becomes clear that while no right of ownership -to be remedied in a court of law -exists, the powers attached to the right of ownership do exist for one or the other of the heroin dealers. Thus, like the dealer, the 'master' of a de facto slave possesses a right of ownership over his or her 'property' but for the fact that such a legal right does not exist as it can not be vindicated in law. In essence, both the dealer and the master exercise powers attached to the right of ownership over their illegal 'property', but do not exercise any legal rights of ownership. If the argument being put forward is correct, then it creates a true avenue in international criminal law for the prosecution of individuals involved in enslavement, while giving advocates a wide enough berth to use the definition of slavery found in the 1926 Convention to combat what they term 'contemporary forms of slavery'.
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Id., para. 122. The Appeals Chamber continued: Aside from the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate in the circumstances of this case to emphasise the citation by the Trial Chamber of the following excerpt from the Pohl case:
Slavery may exist even without torture. Slaves may be well fed, well clothed, and comfortably housed, but they are still slaves if without lawful process they are deprived of their freedom by forceful restraint. We might eliminate all proof of ill-treatment, overlook the starvation, beatings, and other barbarous acts, but the admitted fact of slavery -compulsory uncompensated labour -would still remain . There is no such thing as benevolent slavery. Involuntary servitude, even if tempered by humane treatment, is still slavery.
The passage speaks of slavery; it applies equally to enslavement. 
